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Abstract
In the customary VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism truth-telling is a
dominant strategy. In this paper we study the sequential VCG mechanism and
show that other dominant strategies may then exist. We illustrate how this fact can
be used to minimize taxes using examples concerned with Clarke tax and public
projects.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
One of the basic assumptions of game theory is that each player is rational, which means
that he seeks to maximize his own utility. However, in many circumstances it is also
natural to assume that players, when facing a choice, will seek to maximize the utilities
of other players, as well.
Such an additional assumption can be used to capture in the game-theoretic frame-
work a ’social attitude’ of the players. To quote from Bowles [2004, page 109] (both
emphases in the text): “Other-regarding preferences include spite, altruism, and caring
about the relationship among the outcomes for oneself and others. [. . . ] The key aspect
of other-regarding preferences is that one’s evaluation of a state depends on how it is ex-
perienced by others.” Bowles also provides the following elegant quote from Dalai Lama:
“The intelligent way to be selfish is to work for the welfare of others”.
This additional assumption is also natural in games in which players may or will
play repeatedly. Then punishing the other players may have an adverse effect on future
rounds in which the punished players may reciprocate. Further, the players who found out
that they were punished when another alternative existed may simply refuse to engage in
future rounds of the game.
In strategic games the attitude of other players is detected only a posteriori. In
contrast, when a game is played sequentially, the attitude of players who already moved
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is known a priori to players who still need to move. To illustrate these matters on a simple
example consider the following strategic game:
L C R
T 5, 1 0, 0 0, 0
B 0, 0 1, 5 5, 5
Suppose this game is played sequentially under the usual assumption that each player
is rational and that this fact is a common knowledge. So second player always chooses a
best response and first player knows this.
If player 1 begins, then strategy T guarantees him a payoff of 5, but player 2 will
only receive 1. Strategy B also guarantees player 1 a payoff of 5, but only if player 2
is willing to select then strategy R. If player 2 begins, then he will choose either C or
R. Both strategies guarantee him a payoff of 5. However, in the first case player 1 will
receive only 1, while in the latter case he will receive 5. So irrespectively of the order of
the play ’socially responsible’ players would select in this game strategies B and R.
1.2 Sequential VCG mechanism
In this paper we consider such matters in the context of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mecha-
nism, in short VCG mechanism. Its purpose is to induce players to reveal their true types
(preferences), usually in various types of auctions or matters concerning public projects.
When this is the case, the mechanism is called strategy-proof. The VCG mechanism
achieves this by means of transfers. In an important special case of the VCG mechanism,
called Clarke mechanism, the transfers become taxes imposed on the players. The un-
derlying game-theoretical framework is that of a revelation-type pre-Bayesian game, see
Ashlagi, Monderer and Tennenholtz [2006].
In the VCG mechanism the players move simultaneously and do not know each other
types or utilities (except in degenerated situations), so the above discussion of the atti-
tudes towards the other players does not apply. However, when players move sequentially
the situation changes because each player knows the types reported by the previous play-
ers. In the resulting set-up the above considerations about attitudes naturally apply. In
particular, in the case of sequential Clarke mechanism, the only way player i can increase
the payoff of player j is by reducing player’s j taxes, which leads us to an analysis when
taxes can be minimized.
Sequential VCG mechanism applies to a realistic situation in which there is no central
authority that computes and imposes taxes and the order in which the players move
depends on Nature.
In this paper we study these matters in a systematic way, by analyzing dominant
strategies in the sequential VCG mechanism and by relating them to dominant strategies
in sequential pre-Bayesian games. Sequential VCG mechanism is relevant for various
types of auctions and for various matters concerned with public projects. The latter area
is of natural interest to us, as one is then naturally led to the problem of maximizing
social welfare through a minimization of taxes. This explains why our three examples are
concerned with Clarke tax and public projects.
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1.3 Related work
To our knowledge sequential mechanism design was studied only in the context of im-
plementation theory. This theory focusses on a related, but different issue of designing a
game whose set of equilibria coincides with the outcomes of a given multi-valued decision
function. An early reference on sequential implementation is Moore and Repullo [1988]
in which the implementation by means of a subgame perfect equilibrium is studied.
More recently, Parkes and Shneidman [2004] studied a way of realizing the VCG
mechanism with the role of the central planner reduced to a minimum. This leads to a
distributed implementation of VCG mechanism.
The problem of minimizing taxes was recently addressed in Cavallo [2006], who studied
the issue of redistributing the taxes in the (customary) VCG mechanism, so with truth-
telling as the dominant strategy. Instead, in our approach we focus on minimizing taxes
by means of dominant strategies that differ from truth-telling.
The consequences of sequentiality have also been studied in voting theory and pri-
vate contributions to public goods. In particular, Dekel and Piccione [2000] explore the
relationship between simultaneous and sequential voting games and Varian [1994] studies
the behavior of players depending on which position they have to take a decision.
1.4 Plan of the paper
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we recall the VCG mechanism
and Clarke mechanism by focussing on the decision problems. Next, in Section 3, we
clarify why in many natural circumstances truthful reporting in VCG mechanism is indeed
necessary. Then, in Section 4, we consider sequential decision problems and in Section 5
we clarify the relation with sequential pre-Bayesian games.
The sequential VCG mechanism is discussed in Section 6. In the last three sections
of the paper we consider specific instances concerned with Clarke tax and public projects.
In each case we give dominant strategies that minimize players’ taxes and are different
from truth-telling.
2 Preliminaries
We recall here briefly the VCG mechanism, see, e.g. Jackson [2003]. Assume a set of
decisions D, a set {1, . . ., n} of players, for each player a set of types Θi and a utility
function vi : D ×Θi →R.
A decision rule is a function f : Θ→D, where Θ := Θ1 × · · · × Θn. We call the
tuple
(D,Θ1, . . .,Θn, v1, . . ., vn, f)
a decision problem .
Given a decision problem one is interested in the following sequence of events:
(i) each player i receives a type θi,
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(ii) each player i announces to the central planner a type θ′i; this yields a joint type
θ′ := (θ′1, . . ., θ
′
n),
(iii) the central planner makes the decision d := f(θ′), and communicates it to each
player,
(iv) the resulting utility for player i is then vi(d, θi).
In mechanism design one is interested in the ways of inducing the players to submit
their true types. This motivates the following two concepts.
A decision rule f is called strategy-proof if for all θ ∈ Θ, i ∈ {1, . . ., n} and θ′i
vi(f(θi, θ−i), θi) ≥ vi(f(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi).
Intuitively, this means that submitting one’s true type (θi) is better than submitting
another type (θ′i). That is, false submission does not get one better off.
A decision rule f is called efficient if for all θ ∈ Θ and d′ ∈ D
n∑
i=1
vi(f(θ), θi) ≥
n∑
i=1
vi(d
′, θi).
Intuitively, this means that for all θ ∈ Θ, f(θ) yields a decision d for which the society
benefit , defined as
∑n
i=1 vi(d, θi), is maximal.
Recall that the VCG mechanism is constructed by combining decision rules with trans-
fer payments. It is obtained by first modifying a decision problem (D,Θ1, . . .,Θn, v1, . . ., vn, f)
to the following one:
• the set of decisions is D × Rn,
• the decision rule is a function (f, t) : Θ→D×Rn, where t : Θ→ Rn and (f, t)(θ) :=
(f(θ), t(θ)),
• each utility function for player i is a function ui : D × R
n × Θi → R defined by
ui(d, t1, . . ., tn, θi) := vi(d, θi) + ti.
So when the received type of player i is θi and his announced type is θ
′
i, his utility is
ui((f, t)(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi) = vi(f(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi) + ti(θ
′
i, θ−i), where θ−i are the types announced by
the other players.
We call then (D×Rn,Θ1, . . .,Θn, u1, . . ., un, (f, t)) a transfer-based decision prob-
lem and refer to t as the transfer function .
The VCG mechanism is obtained by using the transfer function t := (t1, . . ., tn),
where for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}
• hi : Θ−i → R is an arbitrary function,
• ti : Θ→ R is defined by
1 ti(θ) := hi(θ−i) +
∑
j 6=i vj(f(θ), θj).
1Here and below
∑
j 6=i is a shorthand for the summation over all j ∈ {1, . . ., n}, j 6= i.
4
Intuitively, the sum
∑
j 6=i vj(f(θ), θj) represents the society benefit from the decision
f(θ), with player i excluded.
The VCG mechanism depends on the sequence of functions h1, . . ., hn. Occasionally
we shall refer to ‘each’ mechanism to stress that the result does not depend on the choice
of these functions. Finally, recall the following crucial result.
VCG Theorem Suppose the decision rule f is efficient. Then in each VCG mechanism
the decision rule (f, t) is strategy-proof.
Proof. For all θ ∈ Θ, i ∈ {1, . . ., n} and θ′i we have by definition of the VCG mechanism
and the fact that f is efficient:
ui((f, t)(θi, θ−i), θi) =
n∑
j=1
vi(f(θi, θ−i), θi) + hi(θ−i)
≥
n∑
j=1
vi(f(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi) + hi(θ−i)
= ui((f, t)(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi).
✷
In each VCGmechanism given the sequence θ of announced types, t(θ) = (t1(θ), . . ., tn(θ))
is the sequence of the resulting payments that the players have to make. If ti(θ) ≥ 0,
we say that player i receives the payment ti(θ) and otherwise that player i makes the
payment |ti(θ)|.
A special case of the VCG mechanism, called Clarke mechanism , is obtained by
using
hi(θ−i) := −max
d∈D
∑
j 6=i
vj(d, θj).
So then
ti(θ) :=
∑
j 6=i
vj(f(θ), θj)−max
d∈D
∑
j 6=i
vj(d, θj).
Hence for all θ and i ∈ {1, . . ., n} we have ti(θ) ≤ 0, which means that each player needs
to make the payment |ti(θ)| that we call a tax .
3 Truthful reporting in the VCG mechanism
The following simple observation shows that for each player in each VCG mechanism his
payoff remains the same if his submitted type leads to the same decision as his true type.
Lemma 3.1 Let (D,Θ1, . . .,Θn, v1, . . ., vn, f) be a decision problem with efficient f . Let
θ ∈ Θ and θ′i ∈ Θi. In each VCG mechanism
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(i) if
f(θ′i, θ−i) = f(θi, θ−i), (1)
then ui((f, t)(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi) = ui((f, t)(θi, θ−i), θi),
(ii) if f(θ′i, θ−i) 6= f(θi, θ−i) and
n∑
j=1
vj(f(θ
′
i, θ−i), θj) 6=
n∑
j=1
vj(f(θi, θ−i), θj) (2)
then ui((f, t)(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi) < ui((f, t)(θi, θ−i), θi).
Proof. By definition of the VCG mechanism we have
ui((f, t)(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi) =
n∑
j=1
vj(f(θ
′
i, θ−i), θj) + hi(θ−i)
and
ui((f, t)(θi, θ−i), θi) =
n∑
j=1
vj(f(θi, θ−i), θj) + hi(θ−i).
This directly implies (i). To prove (ii) note that by efficiency of f and the second as-
sumption of (ii)
n∑
j=1
vj(f(θ
′
i, θ−i), θj) <
n∑
j=1
vj(f(θi, θ−i), θj).
This implies (ii). ✷
Note that in the proof of (i) efficiency of f is not used and that in (ii) the first
assumption is implied by the second.
Observation (i) is of limited use since in the VCG mechanism players submit their
types simultaneously and in general player i does not know the other submitted types
θ−i. So he has no way of ensuring that equality (1) holds for his submitted type θ
′
i and
the other submitted types θ−i.
In contrast, observation (ii) is of use in a number of situations. Namely, if player i
knows the underlying decision problem (D,Θ1, . . .,Θn, v1, . . ., vn, f), he can check for his
true type θi and another type θ
′
i whether (2) holds for some θ−i. If it does, he has to
submit his true type θi.
Now, in several natural instances of the VCG mechanism for all i and θi 6= θ
′
i inequal-
ity (2) holds for some θ−i. In these instances players have to submit their true types.
Examples include public project examples that we discuss in later sections.
Moreover, even if a player knows the types submitted by the other players he still
may be forced to submit his true type when he does not know their utility functions.
The following general result clarifies this claim. We assume here that player i knows
D,Θ1, . . .,Θn, f , knows that the decision function f is efficient and knows the submitted
types θj for j 6= i, but does not know vj for j 6= i.
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Theorem 3.2 Let Θi := {θi, θ
′
i} and Θj := {θj} for j 6= i and let f : Θ1×· · ·×Θn →D
be a decision function. Suppose that2
vi(f(θi, θ−i), θ
′
i) + vi(f(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi) < vi(f(θi, θ−i), θi) + vi(f(θ
′
i, θ−i), θ
′
i). (3)
Then for some utility functions vj, where j 6= i
• f is efficient,
• in each resulting VCG mechanism ui((f, t)(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi) < ui((f, t)(θi, θ−i), θi).
Proof. For simplicity of notation, let
d := f(θi, θ−i)
d′ := f(θ′i, θ−i)
and
q := vi(d
′, θi)− vi(d, θi).
Fix some j 6= i, take ǫ ∈ (0, vi(d, θi) + vi(d
′, θ′i)− (vi(d, θ
′
i) + vi(d
′, θi))], and define
vj(d, θj) := q + ǫ,
vj(d
′, θj) := 0,
vk(e, θk) := 0 for k 6= i, j and arbitrary e.
Hence we have
n∑
k=1
vk(d, θk) = vi(d, θi) + q + ǫ = vi(d
′, θi) + ǫ, (4)
n∑
k=1
vk(d
′, θk) = vi(d
′, θi), (5)
∑
k 6=i
vk(d, θk) + vi(d, θ
′
i) = vi(d, θ
′
i) + q + ǫ, (6)
∑
k 6=i
vk(d
′, θk) + vi(d
′, θ′i) = vi(d
′, θ′i),. (7)
First, we show that given these utility functions ui((f, t)(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi) < ui((f, t)(θi, θ−i), θi)
holds. We have
ui((f, t)(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi) =
n∑
k=1
vk(d
′, θk) + hi(θ−i)
= vi(d
′, θi) + hi(θ−i)
< vi(d
′, θi) + ǫ+ hi(θ−i)
=
n∑
k=1
vk(d, θk) + hi(θ−i)
= ui((f, t)(θi, θ−i), θi)
2Intuitively, this condition states that the aggregate utility for player i is strictly higher for truthful
reporting.
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where the second equality follows by (5), the inequality is a direct consequence of ǫ > 0,
and the third equality follows by (4).
Next, we show that f is efficient. Since we only have two type profiles we only have
to show
n∑
k=1
vk(d, θk) ≥
n∑
k=1
vk(d
′, θk) (8)
and
∑
k 6=i
vk(d
′, θk) + vi(d
′, θ′i) ≥
∑
k 6=i
vk(d, θk) + vi(d, θ
′
i). (9)
To prove (8) note that
n∑
k=1
vk(d, θk) = vi(d
′, θi) + ǫ > vi(d
′, θi) =
n∑
k=1
vk(d
′, θk),
where the first equality follows by (4) and the second one by (5).
Next, to prove (9) note that
∑
k 6=i
vk(d
′, θk) + vi(d
′, θ′i) = vi(d
′, θ′i)
> vi(d, θ
′
i) + vi(d
′, θi)− vi(d, θi)
= vi(d, θ
′
i) + q
> vi(d, θ
′
i) + q + ǫ
=
∑
k 6=i
vk(d, θk) + vi(d, θ
′
i)
where the first equality follows by (7), the first inequality is a direct consequence of (3),
the second equality follows by definition of q, and the last equality is a direct consequence
of (6). ✷
As an aside note that asumption (3) in the above theorem is necessary.
Theorem 3.3 Let (D,Θ1, . . .,Θn, v1, . . ., vn, f) be a decision problem with efficient f .
Suppose that in some VCG mechanism for some θ ∈ Θ and θ′i ∈ Θi
ui((f, t)(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi) < ui((f, t)(θi, θ−i), θi).
Then (3) holds.
Proof. ui((f, t)(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi) < ui((f, t)(θi, θ−i), θi) implies∑
j 6=i
vj(f(θ
′
i, θ−i), θj) + vj(f(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi) <
∑
j 6=i
vj(f(θi, θ−i), θj) + vj(f(θi, θ−i), θi).
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By efficiency of f we have
∑
j 6=i
vj(f(θi, θ−i), θj) + vi(f(θi, θ−i), θ
′
i) ≤
∑
j 6=i
vj(f(θ
′
i, θ−i), θj) + vi(f(θ
′
i, θ−i), θ
′
i).
By adding up these inequalities we get
vi(f(θi, θ−i), θ
′
i) + vi(f(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi) < vi(f(θi, θ−i), θi) + vi(f(θ
′
i, θ−i), θ
′
i).
✷
We clarified here why in many natural circumstances truthful reporting in VCG
mechanism is necessary. We now show that in sequential VCG mechanism this does not
need to be the case.
4 Sequential decision problems
In the original set up of a decision problem all players announce their types simul-
taneously. We now consider a modification of this problem in which types are an-
nounced sequentially in a random order. For notational simplicity, we consider the
order to be 1, . . ., n. To capture this type of situations, given the decision problem
(D,Θ1, . . .,Θn, v1, . . ., vn, f) we consider a modified sequence of events in which events
(ii) and (iii) of Section 2 are replaced by:
(ii)′ successively stages 1, . . ., n take place, where in stage i player i
announces to the other players a type θ′i;
this yields a joint type θ′ := (θ′1, . . ., θ
′
n).
(iii)′ each player makes the decision d := f(θ′).
We call the resulting situation a sequential decision problem . So in a sequential
decision problem no central planner exists and the decisions are taken by the players
themselves. Each player i knows the types announced by players 1, . . ., i−1. He can then
use this information to decide which type to announce. To properly describe this situation
we need to consider strategies. In this context, a strategy of player i is a function
si : Θ1 × . . .×Θi →Θi.
We then assume that in the considered sequential decision problem each player uses
a strategy si(·) to select the type he will announce. We say then that the strategy si(·)
of player i is dominant if for all θ ∈ Θ, i ∈ {1, . . ., n} and θ′i
vi(f(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i), θi) ≥ vi(f(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi).
In this context, θ1, . . ., θi−1 are the announced types of players 1, . . ., i− 1, while θi is the
type player i has received.
Consider now the projection function
πi : Θ1 × . . .×Θi →Θi,
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where πi(θ1, . . ., , θi) := θi. Note that π1(·) is the identity function. In this context the
projection function πi(·) as a strategy for player i corresponds to his truth-telling.
We have then the following observation the proof of which is immediate and omitted.
Note 4.1 Given a decision problem (D,Θ1, . . .,Θn, v1, . . ., vn, f) the decision rule f is
strategy-proof iff for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n} the projection function πi(·) is a dominant strategy
for player i in the corresponding sequential decision problem.
5 Sequential pre-Bayesian games
Before we consider sequential VCG mechanisms let us clarify the connection between
sequential decision problems and strategic games. To this end we consider a modification
of pre-Bayesian games (see e.g. Ashlagi, Monderer and Tennenholtz [2006]). These games
are distinguished by the fact that each player has a private type on which he can condition
his strategy.
5.1 Pre-Bayesian games
Recall first that a pre-Bayesian game for n players consists of
• a set Ai of actions ,
• a set Θi of types ,
• a payoff function
pi : A1 × . . .× An ×Θi →R,
for each player i.
Let Θ := Θ1 × . . . × Θn and A := A1 × . . . × An. In a pre-Bayesian game Nature
moves first and provides each player i with a type θi ∈ Θi. Subsequently the players
simultaneously select their actions. Each player knows only his type. The payoff function
of each player now depends on his type, so after each player selected his action, each
player knows his payoff but does not know the payoffs of the other players.
The customary notion of a dominant strategy is naturally adapted as follows. First,
a strategy in a pre-Bayesian game is now a function si : Θi → Ai. Further, a strategy
si(·) of player i in a pre-Bayesian game is called dominant if for all a ∈ A and θi ∈ Θi
pi(si(θi), a−i, θi) ≥ pi(ai, a−i, θi).
Finally, a pre-Bayesian game is of a revelation-type if Ai = Θi for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}.
We denote then the elements of Ai by ai or θi. So in a revelation-type pre-Bayesian game
the strategies of a player are the functions on his set of types.
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5.2 Sequential pre-Bayesian games
In this modification of pre-Bayesian games Nature moves again first and provides a type
θi ∈ Θi for each player i and an order, say 1, . . ., n, in which the players sequentially select
their actions. We call the resulting game a sequential pre-Bayesian game. In this
game a strategy of player i is now a function
si : A1 × . . .× Ai−1 ×Θi → Ai.
Such a strategy si(·) of player i is now called dominant if for all a ∈ A and θi ∈ Θi
pi(si(a1, . . ., ai−1, θi), a−i, θi) ≥ pi(ai, a−i, θi).
As before a sequential pre-Bayesian game is of a revelation-type if Ai = Θi for all
i ∈ {1, . . ., n}. With each decision problem (D,Θ1, . . .,Θn, v1, . . ., vn, f) we can associate
a revelation-type (sequential or not) pre-Bayesian game by defining each payoff function
pi by pi(θ, θ
′
i) := vi(f(θ), θ
′
i).
The following observation then clarifies the connection between dominant strategies
in the sequential decision problems and sequential pre-Bayesian games. The proof is
straightforward and therefore omitted.
Note 5.1 A strategy s(·) of player i is dominant in the sequential decision problem
(D,Θ1, . . .,Θn, v1, . . ., vn, f) iff it is dominant in the corresponding sequential revelation-
type pre-Bayesian game.
Consequently, by Note 4.1, the decision rule f is strategy-proof iff for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}
the projection function πi(·) is a dominant strategy for player i in the corresponding
sequential revelation-type pre-Bayesian game.
6 Sequential VCG mechanism
A particular case of sequential decision problems is the sequential VCG mechanism.
We now analyze dominant strategies in its context. The crucial difference between the
customary set-up and the one now considered is that player i knows the types announced
by players 1, . . ., i− 1. He can then exploit this information when choosing the type he is
to announce. In the subsequent sections we show that in a number of natural instances
of the sequential Clarke mechanism other dominant strategies for players exist than the
projection function (that is, truth-telling) and that they can be used to minimize taxes.
The following consequence of Lemma 3.1 provides us with a simple method of deter-
mining whether a strategy is dominant in the sequential VCG mechanism.
Lemma 6.1 Let (D,Θ1, . . .,Θn, v1, . . ., vn, f) be a decision problem with efficient f . In
each sequential VCG mechanism,
(i) if for all θ ∈ Θ
f(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i) = f(θi, θ−i),
then strategy si(·) is dominant for player i,
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(ii) if for some θ ∈ Θ
f(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i) 6= f(θi, θ−i)
and
∑
j∈N
vj(f(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i), θj) 6=
∑
j∈N
vj(f(θi, θ−i), θj),
then strategy si(·) is not dominant for player i.
Proof.
(i) Take an arbitrary θ ∈ Θ and θ′i ∈ Θi. By Lemma 3.1(i)
ui((f, t)(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i), θi) = ui((f, t)(θi, θ−i), θi).
But by the VCG Theorem the decision rule (f, t) is strategy-proof, so for every θ′i ∈ Θi
we have
ui((f, t)(θi, θ−i), θi) ≥ ui((f, t)(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi),,
which concludes the proof.
(ii) By Lemma 3.1(ii) it follows
ui((f, t)(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i), θi) < ui((f, t)(θi, θ−i), θi),
which concludes the proof. ✷
Intuitively, this lemma states that if the choice of type determined by strategy si(·)
always leads to the same decision as truth-telling, then si(·) is dominant. Besides, if there
is a type profile for which strategy si(·) leads to a different decision than truth-telling and
to which the society is not indifferent, then the strategy is not dominant.
In the remainder of the paper we show that in a number of natural instances of the
sequential VCG mechanism natural dominant strategies different than truth-telling exist.
All of them deal with Clarke taxes in the context of public projects.
Recall that in Clarke mechanism, if player i submits a type θ′i and the other submitted
types are θ−i, each player j pays the tax |tj(θ
′
i, θ−i)|, where
tj(θ
′
i, θ−i) :=
∑
k 6=i,j
vk(f(θ
′
i, θ−i), θj) + vi(f(θ
′
i, θ−i), θ
′
i)−max
d∈D
(
∑
k 6=i,j
vk(d, θj) + vi(d, θ
′
i)).
In the sequential Clarke mechanism we have tj(θ
′
i, θ−i) ≤ 0, so player i, when using
Lemma 6.1(i) to minimize player’s j tax, solves the following maximization problem:
maximize tj(θ
′
i, θ−i) subject to θ
′
i ∈ Θi and f(θ
′
i, θ−i) = f(θi, θ−i). (10)
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7 Example: public project I
This example corresponds to the decision problem (D,Θ1, . . .,Θn, v1, . . ., vn, f), where
• D = {0, 1} (reflecting whether a project is cancelled or takes place),
• each Θi is a set of non-negative reals, including 0 and c,
• vi(d, θi) := d(θi −
c
n
),
• f(θ) :=
{
1 if
∑n
i=1 θi ≥ c
0 otherwise
In this setting c is the cost of the project, c
n
is the cost share of the project for each
player, and θi is the value of the project for player i. Besides, note that the decision rule
f is efficient since
∑n
i=1 vi(d, θi) = d(
∑n
i=1 θi − c).
We have then the following result.
Theorem 7.1 The following strategy is dominant for player i in the sequential Clarke
mechanism for the above decision problem:
si(θ1, . . ., θi) :=


θi if
∑i
j=1 θj < c and i < n,
0 if
∑i
j=1 θj < c and i = n,
c if
∑i
j=1 θj ≥ c.
Proof. By Lemma 6.1 it suffices to show that f(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i) = f(θi, θ−i). For this
we consider three cases.
Case 1 si(θ1, . . ., θi) = θi.
Then f(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i) = f(θi, θ−i).
Case 2 si(θ1, . . ., θi) = 0.
By definition of si(·) we have i = n and c >
∑n
j=1 θj ≥ si(θ1, . . ., θi) +
∑
i 6=j θj and
therefore f(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i) = f(θi, θ−i), as both sides equal 0.
Case 3 si(θ1, . . ., θi) = c.
By definition of si(·) we have both
∑n
j=1 θj ≥
∑i
j=1 θj ≥ c and si(θ1, . . ., θi)+
∑
i 6=j θj ≥
c and therefore f(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i) = f(θi, θ−i), as both sides equal 1. ✷
We now prove that in the sequential Clarke mechanism considered in Theorem 7.1
the strategy si(·) of player i simultaneously solves the above maximization problems (10)
for j 6= i, i.e., this strategy of player i minimizes the tax of every other player. More
precisely, we establish the following result.
Theorem 7.2 Consider the sequential Clarke mechanism of Theorem 7.1 and the strat-
egy si(·) of player i introduced there. Suppose that si(θ1, . . ., θi) 6= θi. Then
tj(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i) ≥ tj(θ
′
i, θ−i)
for all j 6= i, θi+1 ∈ Θi+1, . . ., θn ∈ Θn, and θ
′
i ∈ Θi such that f(θ
′
i, θ−i) = f(θi, θ−i).
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In other words, if strategy si(·) of player i deviates from truth-telling, then player i
minimizes taxes of other players under the assumption that he submits a type that will
not alter the decision taken in case of truth telling by all players.
Proof. Let
gj(θ
′
i, θ−i) :=
∑
k 6=i,j
(θk −
c
n
) + θ′i −
c
n
.
We have for all θ ∈ Θ, j 6= i and θ′i
tj(θ
′
i, θ−i) =
{
−maxd∈{0,1} d · gj(θ
′
i, θ−i) if
∑
k 6=i θk + θ
′
i < c
gj(θ
′
i, θ−i)−maxd∈{0,1} d · gj(θ
′
i, θ−i) otherwise
Case 1 si(θ1, . . ., θi) = 0.
By definition of si(·) we have i = n and
∑n
j=1 θj < c. So
∑
j 6=i θj + si(θ1, . . ., θi) < c.
Also
∑
j 6=i θj + θ
′
i < c since f(θ
′
i, θ−i) = f(θi, θ−i). Hence
tj(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i) = − max
d∈{0,1}
d · gj(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i)
and
tj(θ
′
i, θ−i) = − max
d∈{0,1}
d · gj(θ
′
i, θ−i).
But si(θ1, . . ., θi) = 0 ≤ θ
′
i, so
gj(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i) =
∑
k 6=i,j
θk + si(θ1, . . ., θi)−
n− 1
n
c
≤
∑
k 6=i,j
θk + θ
′
i −
n− 1
n
c
= gj(θ
′
i, θ−i),
which implies the claimed inequality.
Case 2 si(θ1, . . ., θi) = c.
Then
∑i
k=1 θk ≥ c and hence
∑
k 6=i θk + si(θ1, . . ., θi) ≥ c, so gj(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i) ≥ 0
and
tj(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i) = gj(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i)− max
d∈{0,1}
d · gj(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i) = 0.
Moreover,
∑n
k=1 θn ≥
∑i
k=1 θk ≥ c, so also
∑
k 6=i θk + θ
′
i ≥ c since f(θ
′
i, θ−i) =
f(θi, θ−i). Hence tj(θ
′
i, θ−i) = gj(θ
′
i, θ−i)−maxd∈{0,1} d · gj(θ
′
i, θ−i) ≤ 0. ✷
Let us illustrate the above two theorems by two examples.
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player value set of types (Θi) Clarke tax cost share utility (ui)
A 60 R+ 0 100 −40
B 70 R+ 0 100 −30
C 250 R+ 70 100 150
Table 1: Clarke taxes: the project takes place
Example 7.3 Suppose there are three players, A, B, and C whose types (values) are
respectively 60, 70, and 250, each player can submit an arbitrary non-negative value, and
the total cost c of the project equals 300. In the customary situation, when the players
submit their values simultaneously the project takes place (the efficient decision is 1) and
we get the situation summarized in Table 1, where R+ denotes the set of non-negative
reals.
Consider now the situation in which the players submit their values sequentially and
each of them follows strategy si(·). There are three possible cases. The resulting taxes
are summarized in Table 2.
• Player A is the last player.
According to strategy si(·) players B and C will submit their true values, since for
each of them the first alternative in the definition of si(·) holds. However, player
A will submit 300 since for him the third alternative holds. The tax of player B
remains 0, but the tax of player C gets modified and, in accordance with the proof
of Theorem 7.2 (Case 2 ), becomes 0.
• Player B is the last player.
The situation is analogous to the previous case. Player B will submit 300. As a
result all taxes become 0.
• Player C is the last player.
Here players A and B will submit their true values, but player C will submit 300.
This does not modify the taxes of players A and B (which remain 0) and player’s C
tax also remains 70.
Note that in the first two cases, according to strategy si(·), if player C is second he
will submit 300, but this is irrelevant for the analysis. We conclude that if each player
follows strategy si(·), in four out of six orderings all taxes are reduced to 0.
This example also shows that if strategy si(·) of player i does not deviate from truth-
telling, then player i does not need to minimize taxes of other players. Indeed, if player
C is the last player, then according to the si(·) strategy the second player will submit his
true value, whereas submitting 300, a value that would not alter the decision taken, would
reduce the tax of player C to 0. The problem is of course that the second player does not
know which decision will be taken and hence, by Lemma 6.1(i), is bound to submit his
true value. ✷
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ordering tA tB tC
A B C 0 0 70
A C B 0 0 0
B A C 0 0 70
B C A 0 0 0
C A B 0 0 0
C B A 0 0 0
Table 2: Clarke taxes in the sequential cases
In general, if i is the first player for which
∑i
j=1 θj ≥ c, then according to strategy
si(·) he will submit c. This reduces the taxes of all players except him to 0 (Case 2 in
the proof of Theorem 7.2). Player’s i tax may or may not become 0. If he is not the last
player, then all players i+1, . . ., n following him will also submit c, which will ensure that
all taxes including the one of player i will become 0.
If for no i,
∑i
j=1 θj ≥ c, the situation changes, as the following example illustrates.
Example 7.4 We change the setting of the previous example and assume that the values
of players A, B, and C are respectively 60, 70, and 150 while the project cost remains
300. Now when they submit their values simultaneously the project does not take place
(the efficient decision is 0) and we get the situation summarized in Table 3.
player value set of types (Θi) Clarke tax cost share utility (ui)
A 60 R+ 20 0 −20
B 70 R+ 10 0 −10
C 150 R+ 0 0 0
Table 3: Clarke taxes: the project does not take place
In the sequential case, according to the strategy si(·), the first two players will submit
their true types and the last player will submit 0, since for him the second alternative in
the definition of si(·) holds.
Again we have three cases. The resulting taxes are summarized in Table 4.
• Player A is the last player.
By submitting 0 player A reduces the tax of player B to 0, the tax of player C
remains 0 and the tax of player A remains 20.
• Player B is the last player.
By submitting 0 player B reduces the tax of player A to 0, the tax of player C
remains 0 and the tax of player B remains 10.
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• Player C is the last player.
By submitting 0 player C reduces the taxes of players A and B to 0 and his tax
remains 0.
ordering tA tB tC
A B C 0 0 0
A C B 0 10 0
B A C 0 0 0
B C A 20 0 0
C A B 0 10 0
C B A 20 0 0
Table 4: Clarke taxes in the sequential cases
So we see that in each ordering some tax gets reduced and in two out of six orderings
all taxes get reduced to 0. ✷
8 Example: public project II
Consider now a modification of the above example in which each Θi is a real interval
[0, ri], where ri ≥ 0. The following is a counterpart of Theorem 7.1.
Theorem 8.1 The following strategy is dominant for player i in the corresponding se-
quential Clarke mechanism:
si(θ1, . . ., θi) :=


θi if
∑i
j=1 θj < c,
∑i
j=1 θj +
∑n
j=i+1 rj ≥ c,
0 if
∑i
j=1 θj +
∑n
j=i+1 rj < c,
ri if
∑i
j=1 θj ≥ c.
Proof.As in the proof of Theorem 7.1, it suffices to show by Lemma 3.1 that f(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i) =
f(θi, θ−i). For this we consider three cases.
Case 1 si(θ1, . . ., θi) = θi.
Then f(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i) = f(θi, θ−i).
Case 2 si(θ1, . . ., θi) = 0.
By definition of si(·) we have c >
∑i
j=1 θj +
∑n
j=i+1 rj ≥
∑i−1
j=1 θj +
∑n
j=i+1 rj ≥∑
j 6=i θj = si(θ1, . . ., θi) +
∑
i 6=j θj and therefore f(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i) = f(θi, θ−i) as both
sides equal 0.
Case 3 si(θ1, . . ., θi) = ri. By definition of si(·) we have both c ≤
∑i
j=1 θj ≤
∑n
j=1 θj and
c ≤
∑i
j=1 θj ≤
∑i−1
j=1 θj + ri ≤ si(θ1, . . ., θi) +
∑
i 6=j θj and therefore f(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i) =
f(θi, θ−i) as both sides equal 1. ✷
Next, we have the following counterpart of Theorem 7.2.
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Theorem 8.2 Consider the sequential Clarke mechanism of Theorem 8.1 and the strat-
egy si(·) of player i introduced there. Suppose that si(θ1, . . ., θi) 6= θi. Then
tj(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i) ≥ tj(θ
′
i, θ−i)
for all j 6= i, θi+1 ∈ Θi+1, . . ., θn ∈ Θn, and θ
′
i ∈ Θi such that f(θ
′
i, θ−i) = f(θi, θ−i).
Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Theorem 7.2. We consider two cases.
Case 1 si(θ1, . . ., θi) = 0.
By definition of si(·) we have
∑i
j=1 θj +
∑n
j=i+1 rj < c. So
∑
j 6=i θj + si(θ1, . . ., θi) =∑
j 6=i θj ≤
∑i−1
j=1 θj +
∑n
j=i+1 rj < c. Also
∑
j 6=i θj + θ
′
i < c since f(θ
′
i, θ−i) = f(θi, θ−i).
Case 2 si(θ1, . . ., θi) = ri.
Then
∑i
k=1 θk ≥ c and hence
∑
k 6=i θk + si(θ1, . . ., θi) =
∑
k 6=i θk + ri ≥
∑i
k=1 θk ≥ c.
Also
∑
j 6=i θj + θ
′
i ≥ c since f(θ
′
i, θ−i) = f(θi, θ−i).
The rest of the proof of both cases is the same as in the proof of Theorem 7.2. ✷
Let us illustrate now the above two theorems with the following example.
Example 8.3 We modify Example 7.4 by restricting the set of types for each player.
The situation is summarized in Table 5. So when the players submit their values simul-
taneously, no change arises.
player value set of types (Θi) Clarke tax cost share utility (ui)
A 60 [0, 100] 20 0 −20
B 70 [0, 80] 10 0 −10
C 150 [0, 150] 0 0 0
Table 5: Clarke taxes: the project does not take place
However, in the sequential case a new situation arises when player B is the last player.
The reason is that now the second player knows that the project will not take place, that
is for him the second alternative in the definition of si(·) holds. So the second player will
submit 0. Also player B will submit 0. As a result all taxes will be reduced to 0.
In the other ordering of the players the situation will remain as in Example 7.4. In
particular, when player A is the last player his tax will remain 20. The reason is that the
second player does not know yet that the project will not take place, that is for him the
first alternative in the definition of si(·) holds. So the second player will submit his true
value.
The situation is summarized in Table 6.
9 Example: choosing a project
This example corresponds to the decision problem (D,Θ1, . . .,Θn, v1, . . ., vn, f), where
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ordering tA tB tC
A B C 0 0 0
A C B 0 0 0
B A C 0 0 0
B C A 20 0 0
C A B 0 0 0
C B A 20 0 0
Table 6: Clarke taxes in the sequential cases, with limited sets of types
• D = {1, . . ., m} (reflecting which project takes place),
• Θi ⊆ R
m
+ , where for every θi ∈ Θi we have θik ∈ [0, rik] for k ∈ {1, . . ., m},
• vi(d, θi) := θid,
• f(θ) := argmax{
∑n
i=1 θik|k ∈ {1, . . ., m}}.
So each player i submits a vector of m non-negative reals, reflecting his appreciation
for the individual projects. Each real θik is player’s i appreciation for project k and is
taken from the interval [0, rik]. When project d is selected and player’s i true type is θi,
his utility is θid. The decision function f selects the project with the largest aggregated
appreciation (with ties randomly broken). It is easy to see that f is efficient.
When players submit their types sequentially, player i knows the submitted types θj
for j ∈ {1, . . ., i − 1} and his own type θi. Then
∑i
j=1 θjl¯ ≤
∑i
j=1 θjl +
∑n
j=i+1 rjl is the
maximum possible aggregated appreciation for project l, as perceived by player i. We use
it in the following result.
Theorem 9.1 The following strategy is dominant for player i in the sequential Clarke
mechanism for the above decision problem:
si(θ1, . . ., θi) :=


θi if
∑i
j=1 θjl¯ ≤
∑i
j=1 θjl +
∑n
j=i+1 rjl
for all l, l¯ ∈ {1, . . .m}, l 6= l¯,
0i→r
il¯
if
∑i
j=1 θjl¯ >
∑i
j=1 θjl +
∑n
j=i+1 rjl
for all l ∈ {1, . . .m} \ {l¯},
where 0i→r
il¯
is a vector of m reals in which exactly one entry, the ith one, is non-zero.
This entry equals ril¯, the maximum appreciation of player i for project l¯.
Proof.As in the proof of Theorem 7.1, it suffices to show by Lemma 3.1 that f(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i) =
f(θi, θ−i). For this we consider two cases.
Case 1 si(θ1, . . ., θi) = θi.
Then f(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i) = f(θi, θ−i).
Case 2 si(θ1, . . ., θi) = 0i→r
il¯
.
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By definition of si(·) we have
n∑
j=1
θjl¯ >
i∑
j=1
θjl +
n∑
j=i+1
rjl +
n∑
j=i+1
θjl¯ ≥
n∑
j=1
θjl
for every l 6= l¯. Then f(θ1, . . ., θn) = l¯ and
∑
j 6=i
θjl¯ + sil¯(θ1, . . ., θi) =
∑
j 6=i
θjl¯ + ril¯ ≥
i∑
j=1
θjl¯
>
i∑
j=1
θjl +
n∑
j=i+1
rjl ≥
n∑
j=1
θjl ≥
∑
j 6=i
θjl
=
∑
j 6=i
θjl + sil(θ1, . . ., θi)
for every l 6= l¯. Therefore, f(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i) = l¯ = f(θi, θ−i). ✷
Also, as in the earlier two examples strategy si(·) minimizes taxes.
Theorem 9.2 Consider the sequential Clarke mechanism of Theorem 9.1 and the strat-
egy si(·) of player i introduced there. Suppose that si(θ1, . . ., θi) 6= θi. Then
tj(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i) ≥ tj(θ
′
i, θ−i)
for all j 6= i, θi+1 ∈ Θi+1, . . ., θn ∈ Θn, and θ
′
i ∈ Θi such that f(θ
′
i, θ−i) = f(θi, θ−i).
Proof. Let j ∈ {1, . . ., n} \ {i} and θ′i be such that f(θ
′
i, θ−i) = f(θi, θ−i) = l¯. Then
tj(θ
′
i, θ−i) :=
∑
k 6=i,j
θkl¯ + θ
′
il¯
− max
k∈{1,. . .,m}
(
∑
k 6=i,j
θkl + θ
′
il) ≤ 0.
If tj(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i) = 0, the result follows immediately. Hence, assume tj(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i) <
0 and let l˜ = argmax{
∑
k 6=i,j θkl + sil(θ1, . . ., θi)|l ∈ {1, . . ., m}}. Then
tj(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i) =
∑
k 6=i,j
θkl¯ + sil¯(θ1, . . ., θi)− (
∑
k 6=i,j
θkl˜ + sil˜(θ1, . . ., θi))
=
∑
k 6=i,j
θkl¯ + ril¯ − (
∑
k 6=i,j
θkl˜ + 0)
≥
∑
k 6=i,j
θkl¯ + θ
′
il¯
− (
∑
k 6=i,j
θkl˜ + θ
′
il˜
)
≥
∑
k 6=i,j
θkl¯ + θ
′
il¯ − max
l∈{1,. . .,m}
(
∑
k 6=i,j
θkl + θ
′
il)
= tj(θ
′
i, θ−i).
✷
Let us illustrate now the above two theorems with the following example.
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Example 9.3 Suppose that it has to be decided which project out of two is going to
be realized. Moreover, the decision is going to take place depending on the valuations
of three players, A, B, and C, whose types (values) and type spaces are summarized in
Table 7.
player value 1 value 2 set of types (Θi) Clarke tax utility (ui)
A 6 9 [0, 9]× [0, 10] 1 8
B 12 1 [0, 12]× [0, 2] 0 0
C 30 40 [0, 34]× [0, 40] 8 32
Table 7: Clarke taxes: project 2 takes place.
Consider now the situation in which the players submit their values sequentially and
each of them follows strategy si(·). There are three possible cases.
• Player A is the last player.
According to strategy si(·) players B and C will submit their true values, since it
is not known which project will be chosen before A’s submission. Therefore in the
definition of si(·) the first alternative holds for each of them. However, player A
will submit (0, 10) since he knows that project 2 will take place and therefore for
him the second alternative holds. The tax of player A remains 1, that of player B
remains 0, but the tax of player C gets modified becoming 1 instead of 8.
• Player B is the last player.
In this situation, the second player always knows which project will be chosen.
Hence player A will submit (0, 10) when he is second and player C will submit
(0, 40) when he is second. As a result, all taxes become 0.
• Player C is the last player.
This situation is similar to the first one. Here only player C knows that project 2
will be chosen before his submission and can deviate from truth-telling. According
to the si(·) strategy player C will submit (0, 40) while players A and B will submit
their true values. This does not modify the taxes of players B and C (which remain
0 and 8) but player’s A tax becomes 0.
The situation is summarized in Table 8.
✷
References
I. Ashlagi, D. Monderer, and M. Tennenholtz
[2006] Resource selection games with unknown number of players, in: AAMAS ’06: Proceedings of the
Fifth International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, ACM
Press, New York, NY, USA, pp. 819–825.
21
ordering tA tB tC
A B C 0 0 8
A C B 0 0 0
B A C 0 0 8
B C A 1 0 1
C A B 0 0 0
C B A 1 0 1
Table 8: Clarke taxes in the sequential cases of Example 9.3.
S. Bowles
[2004] Microeconomics: Behavior, Institutions, and Evolution, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
R. Cavallo
[2006] Optimal decision-making with minimal waste: Strategyproof redistribution of VCG payments,
in: AAMAS ’06: Proceedings of the Fifth International Joint Conference on Autonomous
Agents and Multiagent Systems, ACM Press, New York, NY, USA, pp. 882–889.
E. Dekel and M. Piccione
[2000] Sequential voting procedures in symmetric binary elections, Journal of Political Economy,
108, pp. 34–55.
M. Jackson
[2003] Mechanism theory, in: Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems, U. Derigs, ed., EOLSS Publish-
ers, Oxford, UK.
J. Moore and R. Repullo
[1988] Subgame perfect implementation, Econometrica, 56, pp. 1191–1220.
D. C. Parkes and J. Shneidman
[2004] Distributed implementations of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms, in: Proc. 3rd Int. Joint
Conf. on Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems, pp. 261–268.
H. Varian
[1994] Sequential provision of public goods, Journal of Public Economics, 53, p. 165 186.
22
